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LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SPECIALIZATION
IN MONTANA: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Duncan Scott
I. INTRODUCTION
Montana Supreme Court Justice Fred Weber recently warned
State Bar of Montana convention delegates that many advertise-
ments by Montana lawyers violate disciplinary rules found in the
Canons of Professional Ethics.1 In particular, he pointed out that
the rules forbid advertisement of legal specialization.' The justice's
remarks coincide with a proposal, now before the State Bar Board
of Trustees, for monitoring advertising by Montana lawyers and
for enforcing relevant disciplinary rules. The proposal contem-
plates referring lawyer advertisements collected by the State Bar's
"clipping service," already in operation, to the State Bar Ethics
Committee, which would then contact the offending lawyer.' Ulti-
mately, the infraction might warrant the filing of a complaint with
the Commission on Practice.4
Although no lawyer has been disciplined yet for violation of
advertising disciplinary rules,5 Justice Weber's remarks and the
proposal before the Board of Trustees suggest that lawyers who
advertise will soon be held accountable to those disciplinary rules.
This comment will examine those rules. It will argue that they are
overly restrictive and that they impede the flow of useful informa-
tion to legal consumers. As guidelines for liberalizing advertising
rules, a proposal now before the American Bar Association (ABA)
and programs in other states will be examined. Finally, this com-
ment will propose an alternative, based on warranty theory, to
state bar regulation of lawyer advertising and specialization.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Origins of the Restrictions
During most of the nineteenth century, lawyers were free to
advertise their services.6 For instance, Abraham Lincoln ran the
1. Great Falls Tribune, June 26, 1981, at 7-A, col. 2.
2. Id.
3. Letter from Justice Fred Weber to David J. Patterson, Chairman, State Bar Ethics
Committee (September 30, 1981).
4. Id.
5. Telephone conversation with Arnold Huppert, Jr., Secretary, Montana Supreme
Court Commission on Practice (December 18, 1981).
6. This absence of restriction arose from a general hostility by the public towards spe-
1
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following newspaper advertisement in 1838:
STUART & LINCOLN, Attorneys and Counsellors at Law, will
practice, conjointly, in the Courts of this Judicial Circuit-Office
No. 4 Hoffman's Row, upstairs. Springfield. 7
In the late nineteenth century, however, various bar organiza-
tions began forming across America and adopting codes of ethics.
Although these early codes generally permitted advertising, pres-
sure was building to ban it." Finally, in 1908 the American Bar
Association, stating that advertising by lawyers was "unprofes-
sional," formally banned the practice by the adoption of the Ca-
nons of Professional Ethics.9 The ban was viewed by various bar
leaders at the time as a means of both maintaining the profession's
traditional dignity and elevating the practice of law above such ac-
tivities as advertising and overt competition found in the
marketplace. 10
This ban on lawyer advertising was largely codified in Canon 2
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted by the ABA in
1969.11 According to the Code, the justification for the ban
is rooted in the public interest. Competitive advertising would en-
courage extravagant, artful, self-laudatory brashness in seeking
business and thus could mislead the layman. Furthermore, it
would inevitably produce unrealistic expectations in particular
cases and bring about distrust of the law and lawyers."
cial privileges granted by government. Professions, particularly bar associations, were
viewed as undemocratic and unamerican. As a result, state legislatures favored minimal re-
strictions on the practice of law. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 19 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
DRNKER]; See also R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 223-42
(1953).
7. L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION 1 (rev.
ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as ANDREWS].
8. DRINKER, supra note 6, at 23, 356.
9. Id. at 215.
10. Drinker traces the origin of this "cherished tradition" to the English Inns of Court,
where law students primarily came from wealthy families. With no need for outside income,
they looked upon law as a form of public service, not as a livelihood. This notion that the
practice of law stands above such marketplace activities as advertising and competition was
brought to the United States by American students who had studied at the Inns. Id. at 210-
11.
11. Smith, Canon 2: A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its
Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 48 TEx. L. REV. 285, 290 (1970).
12. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 2-9 (1969).
These justifications, which in effect say that legal advertising is inherently deceptive and
that broad restrictions further the public interest, were criticised by a three-judge Virginia
district court:
The foundations of the position are disturbing. It assumes either or both of the
following two hypotheses. First, it assumes that lawyers will be "extravagant, art-
ful, self-laudatory, and brash" if released from the bonds of the advertising prohi-
[Vol. 43
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The ban was not the object of much attention until the last
decade. With the rise of the consumers' movement in the late
1960s,'3 attention began to focus on the needs of consumers of le-
gal services. In the early 1970s the ABA, in collaboration with the
American Bar Foundation, conducted a survey in 33 states to de-
termine the public's perception of lawyers and the legal system."
Of particular importance, the survey disclosed that 83 percent of
the people polled agreed with the statement, "A lot of people do
not go to lawyers because they have no way of knowing which law-
yer is competent to handle their particular problem."' 5 This dis-
covery of widespread consumer ignorance about the legal profes-
sion worked to undermine the ABA's rationale that the public
interest required banning lawyer advertising.
Advocates of legal advertising began attacking the ban from
several directions. Articles began surfacing in legal journals arguing
for a removal of the ban. 6 Legal consumers in Virginia turned to
federal court where they successfully overturned state bar restric-
tions placed on what information they could publish about an indi-
vidual lawyer's practice.' 7 Within the ABA itself, a committee pro-
bition. If accurate, it is indeed a sad commentary on a profession, which to a large
extent, is responsible for and necessary to the functioning of our legal system.
Fortunately, however, there is no evidence to suggest that lawyers will behave in
an irresponsible manner if the advertising restrictions are removed . . . . Second,
and perhaps even more disheartening, is the assumption that if any lawyer adver-
tising is permitted, the public will not be able to accurately evaluate its content,
for either they are intellectually incapable of understanding the complexities of
legal services or they will fall prey to every huckster with a promise, law license
and a law book . . . . The hypothesis, fortunately in the view of this Court, is so
baseless as to warrant little concern . . . . Additionally, if consumer judgments
prove to be inadequate, it is indeed an argument for providing them with more
information, not preempting their judgment.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. American Bar Association, 427 F. Supp. 506, 519-
20 (E. Va. 1976) (3-judge panel), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 917 (1977), original opin-
ion reinstated and reissued, 470 F. Supp. 1055 (E. Va. 1979) (3-judge panel), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
13. See generally D. RICE, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 2-10 (1975) (consumer movement
in its historical context).
14. B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC xxvii (1977).
15. Id. at 228.
16. "The rationale that it is not in the public interest for lawyers to advertise does not
hold up under scrutiny." Agate, Legal Advertising and the Public Interest, 50 L.A.B. BULL.
209, 242 (1975); "It is time to amend the code and lift the ban on advertising. It is time the
legal profession entered the nation's open marketplace." Wilson, Madison Avenue, Meet the
Bar, 61 A.B.A. J. 586, 587 (1975); "If the need for legal assistance is to be met and the
profession is to further its goal of public service, the repeal of present restrictions on lawyer-
press communications is essential." Comment, Information Restrictions, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 483, 486 (1974).
17. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. American Bar Association, 427 F. Supp.
506 (E. Va. 1976).
3
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posed a liberal advertising rule that would permit advertising that
did not contain false or misleading statements or claims. 18 The
House of Delegates, the ABA's policy-making body, refused to en-
dorse the proposal at its 1976 meeting. Instead, it adopted a lim-
ited amendment allowing lawyers to communicate certain informa-
tion, such as name, address, nature of practice, and consultation
fees in legal directories, bar association directories and telephone
directory yellow pages.1 9 Forces outside the ABA also applied pres-
sure to ease the advertising restrictions. The Department of Jus-
tice, apparently not satisfied with the ABA's limited amendment,
initiated an antitrust suit against the ABA. The complaint alleged
a conspiracy to prohibit advertising.2
It was against this backdrop of criticism that the Supreme
Court struck down the blanket suppression of lawyer advertising in
the landmark decision Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.2 Because
Bates has been analyzed at length elsewhere, 22 only a short over-
view is necessary for purposes of this comment.
B. The Bates Decision
In 1974 Arizona attorneys John Bates and Van O'Steen set up
a legal clinic in Phoenix. Their aim was to provide inexpensive le-
gal services on routine matters to people who could not qualify for
government legal aid. To keep costs down they relied heavily on
paralegals, automatic typing equipment and standardized forms.
After operating two years they concluded their practice would not
survive if they did not advertise the availability of their low cost
services. Consequently, they placed an advertisement in a newspa-
per that stated they were offering "legal services at very reasonable
fees," and listed their fees for certain services.2 3
In response, the Arizona State Bar president initiated an ac-
tion against the two lawyers for violation of state disciplinary rules
that prohibited advertising. Ultimately the bar's Board of Gover-
nors recommended that each attorney be suspended from the prac-
tice of law for one week. Bates and O'Steen appealed to the Ari-
zona Supreme Court on two grounds: (1) that the disciplinary rule
against advertising violated the Sherman Act because of its ten-
18. ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 2.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 3.
21. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
22. See Meyer and Smith, Attorney Advertising: Bates and a Beginning, 20 Aaiz. L.
REV. 427 (1978).
23. 433 U.S. at 354.
134 [Vol. 43
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dency to limit competition, and (2) that the rule infringed upon
their First Amendment rights.24 The court rejected both claims,"
and the lawyers sought review by the United States Supreme
Court.
On the issue of antitrust, the Supreme Court unanimously
agreed with the Arizona court.2 6 It held that, because the Arizona
Supreme Court ultimately enforced the disciplinary rules, the case
fit within the state-action exemption to antitrust laws. 7 On the
First Amendment issue, however, the Court split, with the majority
ruling in favor of Bates and O'Steen." The Arizona bar offered six
justifications for the ban. These arguments and the Court's re-
sponse to them are treated briefly below:
(1) Adverse Effect on Professionalism
The Arizona bar argued that price advertising would have an
adverse effect on legal professionalism by injecting commercialism
into the practice of law. The Court, referring to the origin of the
ban discussed above, flatly stated that habits and traditions of the
bar are not adequate constitutional defenses.29 It also refused to
view lawyers as above the trades.30
(2) Attorney Advertising as Inherently Misleading
The bar argued that advertising of legal services is inherently
misleading. The Court disagreed, stating that an advertisement is
not misleading as long as the attorney does the necessary work at
the advertised price.3 1 Furthermore, the Court noted that the justi-
fication rests on the assumptions that consumers do not under-
stand the limits of advertising and that they are better kept in ig-
norance than trusted with correct but incomplete information. 2
Both assumptions were rejected by the Court.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 363.
27. Id. at 359-63.
28. Justice Blackman delivered the opinion, in which Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall and Stevens joined. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stewart and Rehnquist
dissented on the First Amendment issue. Id. at 352.
29. Id. at 371.
30. Id. at 371-72.
31. Id. at 372-73.
32. Id. at 374-75.
1982] 135
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(3) Adverse Effect on the Administration of Justice
The bar argued that advertising would create litigation by en-
couraging the assertion of legal rights. The Court rejected this ar-
gument summarily. It found nothing evil in the increased use of
judicial machinery by those who have suffered a wrong."
(4) Undesirable Economic Effects of Advertising
The Arizona bar claimed that advertising would increase legal
fees to consumers because lawyers would pass along advertising
costs. Also, the bar argued that the additional cost of advertising
would act as a barrier to attorneys entering the profession. Noting
that neither argument was relevant to the First Amendment, the
Court pointed out that advertising might reduce legal costs and
make it easier for new attorneys to enter the market.34
(5) Adverse Effect of Advertising on the Quality of Service
The bar argued that a lawyer who advertises a "package" of
legal services at a set price would be inclined to provide the pack-
age regardless of whether it fit the particular client's needs. The
Court, rejecting that claim, stated that an attorney who is inclined
to cut quality will do so regardless of the rule on advertising.3 In
addition, it noted that the bar's assertion was substantially under-
mined by its own prepaid legal services program. 6
(6) Difficulties of Enforcement
Without the ban, the bar argued that it would be impossible
to adequately regulate advertising because a consumer, seeking af-
ter-the-fact action, would not know whether the services he had
received met professional standards. The Court stated that if ad-
vertising were allowed most lawyers would continue to uphold the
integrity of the profession, and if a few did not, the proper re-
course would be to weed them out.37
In short, the Court held that none of the bar's time-honored
justifications supported the suppression of all lawyer advertising.
However, the Court noted that regulation might be proper if the
advertisement referred to quality of service or if the advertisement
33. Id. at 376.
34. Id. at 378.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 379.
[Vol. 43
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was false, deceptive or misleading.88 The dissenting Justices would
have upheld the Arizona restrictions. For example, Justice Powell
stated that the majority holding was not required by either the
First Amendment or public interest. He argued that lawyer adver-
tising was inherently deceptive and difficult to monitor9 Chief
Justice Burger, who also dissented, stated that the majority hold-
ing would "create problems of unmanageable proportions."'40 Fi-
•nally, Justice Rehnquist argued that the First Amendment does
not protect commercial speech. 41
C. Post-Bates
After Bates the ABA amended its model Code of Professional
Responsibility with a new set of advertising disciplinary rules
called Proposal A. This rule specifically authorizes certain pre-
scribed forms of lawyer advertising. 2 In addition to Proposal A,
the ABA approved for circulation to the states a less restrictive
alternative, Proposal B. Instead of attempting to delineate what
may be advertised, Proposal B merely prohibits false, fraudulent,
misleading or deceptive statements.4s By 1981, 30 states had
adopted Proposal A, 18 states and the District of Columbia had
adopted Proposal B, and two states had adopted neither." The
Montana Supreme Court followed Proposal A when it amended
the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1980 to bring them into com-
pliance with Bates.45
III. MONTANA'S ADVERTISING DISCIPLINARY RuLES
A. Current Rules
Montana's advertising disciplinary rules4" prohibit any public
communication that contains a "false, fraudulent, misleading, de-
ceptive, self-laudatory, or unfair statement or claim.' 47 While ad-
38. Id. at 383-84.
39. Id. at 391.
40. Id. at 387.
41. Id. at 404.
42. TASK FORCE ON LAWYER ADVERTISING, ABA, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER ADVERTISING, reprinted in ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 92
[hereinafter cited as REPORT].
43. Id. at 93.
44. ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 135-46.
45. In re: Canons of Professional Ethics Order No. 12500 of Supreme Court, - Mont.
_, 37 St. Rptr. 1069 (1980).
46. See generally STATE BAR OF MONTANA, MONTANA LAWYER'S DESK BOOK (Supp.
1980).
47. MONTANA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, CANON 2, DISCIPLINARY RuLEs [herein-
1982]
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vertising in print media and on radio is specifically permitted, tele-
vision is not, although the rules refer to television broadcast."' The
rules provide that an advertisement may not be distributed or
broadcast beyond the geographical area or areas in which the law-
yer resides, or where a significant part of his clientele resides.4
Also, the rules set out 24 items the advertisement may contain,
such as name of attorney, date of birth, membership in various le-
gal organizations and fees, as long as that information is presented
in a "dignified manner. ' 50 If fee rates are advertised the advertise-
ment must disclose specified information regarding methods of
computation, types of cases covered and estimates of a likely fee. 1
A lawyer may publicaly disclose that his practice is limited to
one or more fields of law.52 In describing the areas of law he prac-
tices, the lawyer may use only the designations set out in the
rules.5 3 The rules list 45 designations." Furthermore, unless admit-
ted to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, a lawyer may not hold himself out publicaly as a special-
ist.5 5 This prohibition will continue unless the State Bar of Mon-
tana adopts a program for certification of legal specialties with the
prior approval of the Montana Supreme Court.5
B. Problems with Current Rules
The advertising disciplinary rules suffer from several defects.
First, they needlessly restrict the flow of useful information to legal
consumers. Second, because of their vagueness they are difficult to
enforce. Third, they tend to limit competition among lawyers.
These defects as they relate to various parts of the rules will be
examined below.
1. Geographical Restrictions
The rules forbid lawyers from advertising beyond the geo-
after cited as DR] 2-101(A) (1980).
48. Although DR 2-101(B) states that lawyers may advertise only by print media or
radio, another disciplinary rule, DR 2-101(E), states that if an advertisement is communi-
cated "to the public over radio or television, it shall be prerecorded, approved for broadcast,
or telecast by the lawyer." (emphasis added).
49. DR 2-101(B).
50. DR 2-101(B)(1) through (24).
51. DR 2-101(B)(21) through (24).
52. DR 2-105(A)(2).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. DR 2-105(A).
56. DR 2-105(A)(3).
[Vol. 43
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graphical area in which they or their clients reside.5 This restric-
tion places an unreasonable burden on a lawyer who wishes to
limit a practice to a narrow field, like copyright law, then advertise
around the state to build a sufficient clientele to support that prac-
tice. A separate problem exists because the rules do not define "ge-
ographical area." Lawyers might shun advertising altogether to
avoid violating the vague standard. For instance, a literal interpre-
tation of the rule prohibits advertising in the state's major newspa-
pers because all those newspapers distribute nearly one-half of
their papers beyond the counties in which they are published." Fi-
nally, it is difficult to discern any justification for the restriction
except on the grounds that it restrains competition.
2. Television Ban
The original justification for the ban on television advertising
was the "fear that advertising by television may be apt to empha-
size style over substance."" It is not clear why information dissem-
inated by newspapers or radio suddenly becomes misleading when
communicated by television. In addition, studies have shown that
low-income groups tend to receive much of their information from
television.60 The effect of this rule is to prevent these people from
receiving information about legal services.
3. Dignified Manner Standard and Prohibition of Self-laudatory
Statements
While legal advertisements must be presented in a "dignified
manner"' and may not contain "self-laudatory statements,"'
neither term is defined by the rules. Critics have labeled both
terms inherently subjective. 3 The effect is that Montana lawyers
cannot know in advance what constitutes permissible advertising.6
57. DR 2-101(B).
58. Approximately 58 percent of the Billings Gazette is distributed beyond Yellow-
stone County, 51 percent of the Great Falls Tribune beyond Cascade County and 48 percent
of the Missoulian beyond Missoula County. Telephone conversations with respective circu-
lation departments (October, 1981).
59. REPORT, supra note 39, at 94.
60. ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 50.
61. DR 2-101(B).
62. DR 2-101(A).
63. ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT) 187-88 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Kutak
draft].
64. For instance, it is unlikely, but unclear whether the followingadvertising campaign
would be allowed. Ken Hur, a Wisconsin trial lawyer, ran an "airplane trailer" with "Call
attorney Ken Hur" over a University of Wisconsin football game. He sponsored a car in a
19821 139
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Bates does not recognize at-
tempts to maintain "dignity" in lawyer advertising as a legitimate
basis for regulation.
4. "Laundry List" Approach to Information
The rules' specification of information that may be communi-
cated "assumes that the bar can identify information that the pub-
lic might think relevant."6 5 Its effect is to needlessly restrict the
flow of useful information to consumers. For instance, the rules set
forth permissive descriptions of legal practices, many of which are
not easily understood by lay people, such as "products liability" or
"general negligence.""" Also, this approach prohibits the type of in-
formational advertising that has been allowed elsewhere with ap-
parent success.6 7
5. Prohibition Against Specialization
The rules permit a lawyer to state that his practice is limited
to certain fields, but the lawyer may not state that he is a special-
ist. Two problems exist with this restriction. First, in theory the
distinction between "practice limited to" and "specialist" is that
the former does not imply that the lawyer possesses a particular
expertise in the area. In practice, however, it is difficult to believe
that most legal consumers will understand this distinction. For ex-
ample, if a consumer chooses a lawyer to handle a parent's estate,
the consumer most likely would conclude that a lawyer with a
practice "limited to probate" is more qualified to handle the mat-
ter than a "general practitioner." However, this consumer is not
demolition derby that had written on its side, "Sideswiped? Call Ken Hur." On the side of a
hearse he drives is written "No Frill Will $15." He also had a television advertisement cam-
paign that showed him emerging from a lake with scuba gear on, urging the audience to
consult him for bankruptcy services if they are "in over their heads." ANDREWS, supra note
7, 11-12.
65. Kutak draft, supra note 63, at 188.
66. Many Montana lawyers who advertise appear to recognize this problem. In viola-
tion of the rules they are either using more commonly understood terms or providing short
elaborations after the accepted terms. See generally Mountain Bell Telephone Directories
for Montana's larger cities. The United States Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdic-
tion of a Missouri case involving a lawyer disciplined for using concededly non-misleading
descriptions of legal areas not contained in Missouri's disciplinary rules. The lawyer used
the terms "Personal injury," "Workmen's Compensation," and "Contracts." In the Matter
of R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1980), prob. jur. noted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3086 (1981) (No. 80-
1431).
67. A Pennsylvania law firm ran a series of 21 advertisements on such topics as "Mak-
ing a Will" and "Getting a Divorce." The advertisements explained in detail what a particu-
lar legal service entails and when it might benefit the consumer to obtain such a service.
ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 44.
140 [Vol. 43
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 43 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/6
LAWYER ADVERTISING
protected if he relies on this apparent expertise. A second, more
general problem, as recognized by nearly every commentator who
has studied lawyer specialization, is that lawyers should be allowed
to practice specialities openly." Reasons for this conclusion in-
clude: (1) de facto specialization exists today, therefore, it should
be formally recognized;19 (2) recognizing specialities will enhance
the competence of lawyers in the particular field;70 (3) consumers
will have access to more information by which to choose a particu-
lar lawyer; 71 (4) specialization will lead to a reduction in legal ser-
vice costs;72 and (5) failure to recognize specialties results in law-
yers being held out as competent in all fields.7 8
C. Further Limitations of the Montana Supreme Court
In addition to the disciplinary rules regarding specialization,
the Montana Supreme Court, in In re Mountain Bell Advertis-
ing, 7  imposed further restrictions on how lawyers may communi-
cate their areas of practice. In Mountain Bell, which was decided
while Proposal A was being considered for adoption by the su-
preme court, the telephone company submitted a proposal to list
33 categories of legal practice in the directory yellow pages of Mon-
tana's largest cities. By paying a fee, a lawyer could be listed under
as many categories as he wished. On each page of the guide was to
be printed a caveat stating that, while the lawyer would accept em-
ployment in the area, he was not a specialist.75 The court, in re-
68. "Virtually every lawyer who has ever studied the problem has concluded that some
sort of specialization program would benefit both the public and the legal profession ....
The problem then is essentially how-not whether-to proceed with specialization."
Hadlow, President's Page, 48 FLA. B.J. 151 (1974).
69. Stephens, Specialization: Review and Preview, ABA STANDING COMMITrEE ON SPE-
CIALIZATION INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 7, 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as BULLETIN].
70. See Adams, The Florida Plan is Best, 48 FLA. B.J. 185 (1974).
71. BULLETIN, supra note 69, at 2.
72. Muris and McChesney, Advertising and the Price and Quality of Legal Service:
The Case for Legal Clinics, 1979 A.B. FOUND. REsEARCH J. 179, 185 (1979).
73. Chief Justice Warren Burger, in his much publicized speech at Fordham Law
School in 1973, suggested that perhaps the most significant cause of inadequate courtroom
performance
is our historic insistence that we treat every person admitted to the bar as quali-
fied to give effective assistance on every kind of legal problem that arises in life
.... It requires only a moment's reflection to see that this assumption is no more
justified than one that postulates that every holder of an M.D. degree is compe-
tent to perform surgery on the infinite range of ailments that afflict the human
animal.
Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Ad-
vocates Essential to Our System of Justice, 42 FORD. L. REv. 227, 231 (1973).
74. - Mont. -, 604 P.2d 760 (1979).
75. The caveat read as follows:
1982]
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jecting the proposal, held that by listing themselves under the pro-
posed categories, lawyers would be holding themselves out as
specialists despite the caveat which the court said benefited only
Mountain Bell and the lawyers.76 The court further held that no
need existed in Montana for this kind of listing.7
The court's holding is flawed in several respects. First, it es-
sentially asserts that consumers will be misled by any guide listing
and that no caveat will be effective. Bates expressly rejects this
assertion.78 Furthermore, the basis for the court's assertion appears
to be a paternalistic attitude toward the state's legal consumers.
Second, the court notes that by placing lawyers under different
categories the impression is created that all lawyers under individ-
ual categories are of equal ability.79 Ironically, the court's solution
to this apparent problem is to lump all lawyers under a yellow
page heading "Lawyers," thus making it appear that all lawyers
are of equal ability in all categories. Third, the court acknowledges
that lawyers may still place their areas of practice in block adver-
tising in yellow pages or newspapers.80 The court fails to explain
why it is not misleading to place this information in a block adver-
tisement without a caveat, but it is misleading when placed in the
lawyer's guide with a caveat. Finally, the court cites no authority
or study in concluding that little or no need exists for the guide.
Nowhere in the opinion does the court address consumers' inter-
ests in the free flow of information, an important consideration in
Bates.81 Instead, the court focuses its attention on the disadvan-
tages of the proposal to lawyers: (1) because of competitive pres-
sure, lawyers would be compelled to list themselves "under a dozen
or more" of the categories," and (2) lawyers in small towns would
generally suffer from a competitive disadvantage.88 The court's fo-
The fields of law named in the listing subheadings indicate the lawyer or law firm
will accept employment for matters coming within the fields of law listed in the
subheadings, but do not indicate that the lawyer or law firm limits or primarily
limits his, her or its practice to or specializes in the fields of law used in the sub-
headings, unless otherwise indicated.
•Id. at -, 604 P.2d at 761.
76. Id. at _., 604 P.2d at 763.
77. Id.
78. Bates, 433 U.S. at 372-75.
79. Mountain Bell, - Mont. -, 604 P.2d at 764.
80. Id. at -, 604 P.2d at 763.
81. Bates, 433 U.S. at 358.
82. Mountain Bell, - Mont. -, 604 P.2d at 764.
83. The court used curious reasoning:
[T]he telephone directories for the larger cities also contain the directories for
smaller towns around the larger cities. . . . A lawyer practicing in a smaller town
listed in such a directory, along with lawyers from the larger city, would find him-
[Vol. 43142
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cus on lawyers rather than consumers is not surprising; although
the legal profession was well represented at the hearing, no con-
sumers were present. 4
In sum, Montana's advertising rules are overly restrictive and
prevent useful information from reaching consumers. In fact, the
rules would prohibit the very advertisement at issue in Bates. The
Bates advertisement lists areas of practice not contained in Mon-
tana's rules, such as divorce, adoption and change of name.85 Sec-
ond, it lists set fees for these services without including the caveat
that the quoted fee is only available to clients whose matters fall
within the service described as required by Montana rules.86 Fi-
nally, the Bates advertisement states that legal services are availa-
ble at very reasonable fees, arguably a self-laudatory statement.87
IV. INTERIM SOLUTIONS
Partial solutions to shortcomings in Montana's rules are found
in a proposal now before the ABA and in programs in effect in
other states. The following discussion will examine both the propo-
sal and the programs. In the next section an alternative solution
based on warranties will be offered.
A. Kutak Commission's Proposed Changes
In May, 1981, the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Profes-
sional Standards released its proposed final draft of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Kutak draft).,8 The Commission,
self unlisted as to specialties in the yellow pages while his colleagues in the larger
city would have such specialty listings. It would be a competitive disadvantage for
example, for a lawyer in Harlowton, Montana, with no listed specialty, to appear
in the same directory with the Billings lawyers ....
Id. Apparently the court did not consider the fact that lawyers in small towns could list
their area of practice and local address in the lawyer guide of the neighboring large city.
84. The State Bar, the Ethics Committee of the State Bar, and two lawyers pro se
filed memoranda urging the court to refuse Mountain Bell's proposal. No consumers filed
memoranda or argued orally.
This illustrates the well-known imbalance created when regulatory bodies contemplate
changes in regulations. Producers, who devote a great proportion of their resources produc-
ing the particular good or service, tend to have strong common interests and to become
politically concentrated. Consumers, on the other hand, generally devote far less of their
time or money consuming a particular good or service. Thus, they tend to lack common
interests and political power. As a result, producers lobby the regulatory body for favorable
rules while consumers do not. In such an atmosphere rules are written to favor the producer.
See generally, M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, 137-60 (1962).
85. Bates, 433 U.S. at 385.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The Commission, which is now soliciting comments on the Kutak draft, intends to
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chaired by Robert J. Kutak, was created in 1977 to undertake "a
comprehensive rethinking of the ethical premises and problems of
the current Model Code of Professional Responsibility.""s Both the
contents and organizational structure of the Kutak draft differ
profoundly from the current Code from which Montana's rules are
derived.90 However, this comment will focus only on the proposed
changes regarding lawyer advertising.
1. Proposed Rules Regarding Advertising
The proposed rules91 permit any communication by a lawyer
as long as the communication is not false or misleading about the
lawyer or his services.' 2 A communication is considered false or
misleading if it falls within any of the following three categories:
(1) it contains a material misrepresentation, or omits a fact neces-
sary to make the statement as a whole not materially misleading;93
(2) it is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results
that the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer
can achieve results by means that violate the rules of professional
conduct or other law," or (3) it compares the lawyer's services with
other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can be factually
substantiated.'5
The proposed rules permit advertising through all public me-
dia, including yellow pages, legal directories, newspapers and other
periodicals, radio and television." Furthermore, the lawyer may
advertise by any written communication that does not involve per-
sonal contact.' 7 The lawyer must keep a recording or copy of his
advertisement or written communication for one year after its dis-
semination.9' The lawyer is forbidden to give anything of value to
another for recommending his services, except payment for permis-
sible advertising or written communications."
Finally, the proposed rules permit communication of the fact
submit the question of the new format to the ABA House of Delegates in January 1982 and
the contents in August 1982. Telephone conversation with staff counsel for Commission (Oc-
tober 1981).
89. Kutak draft, supra note 63, at i.
90. See Kutak, Ethical Standards for the '80s and Beyond, 67 A.B.A. J. 1116 (1981).
91. See Appendix (text of proposed advertising rules).
92. Kutak draft, supra note 63, Rule 7.1.
93. Id., Rule 7.1(a).
94. Id., Rule 7.1(b).
95. Id., Rule 7.1(c).
96. Id., Rule 7.2(a).
97. Id.
98. Id., Rule 7.2(b).
99. Id., Rule 7.2(c).
144 [Vol. 43
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that the lawyer does or does not practice in a particular field of
law. 100 The lawyer may not state or imply, however, that he is a
specialist unless: (1) he is admitted to practice before the United
States Patent and Trademark Office; 10' (2) he practices admiralty
law, 10 or (3) he is permitted to specialize by the state in which he
practices. 08
2. Benefits of Kutak Draft
The advertising rules contained in the Kutak draft address
many of the problems with Montana's rules. By forbidding only
those advertisements that are false or misleading, the Kutak rules
avoid problems created by the laundry list approach, allowing' law-
yers to discover and present information consumers find relevant.
The proposed rules also do away with the permissible descriptions
for areas of practice. A lawyer would be able to describe an area of
practice in any terms appropriate as long as the terms were not
false or misleading. Finally, the proposed rules drop the dignified
manner standard, the geographical restriction, the television ban
and the prohibition against self-laudatory statements. By abolish-
ing these standards and prohibitions the proposed rules should in-
crease the flow of information to consumers.
3. Criticism of Kutak Draft
Although the proposed rules relax restrictions on lawyer ad-
vertising, they do not go far enough. Lawyers are still prohibited
from communicating information to consumers that the consumers
might find useful. First, the proposed rules ban statements likely
to create unjustified expectations about what the lawyer can
achieve.'0 No doubt legal consumers should be protected from the
few lawyers who might attempt to attract business by creating un-
justified expectations through advertising. However, by banning
statements likely to create such expectations, the prohibition goes
too far. According to the drafters, the purpose for the prohibition
is to prevent advertisements about "results obtained on behalf of a
client, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer's re-
cord in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements contain-
ing client endorsements. 10 5 Although many lawyers might blanch
100. Id., Rule 7.4.
101. Id., Rule 7.4(a).
102. Id., Rule 7.4(b).
103. Id., Rule 7.4(c).
104. Id., Rule 7.1(b).
105. Id. at 186.
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at the idea of advertising this sort of information, consumers would
certainly find the information relevant when choosing a particular
lawyer. A sophisticated consumer seeking a lawyer can find out the
lawyer's previous successes or failures through informal channels,
such as business discussions or social gatherings. Less sophisti-
cated consumers, without access to these channels, are effectively
denied this information because of the prohibition.
A second area in which the proposed rules maintain unjusti-
fied restrictions is lawyer specialization. The proposed rules pro-
hibit lawyers from advertising unless their practice lies within nar-
row categories, or unless their practice lies within a state that
permits open specialization. 10 6 As mentioned above, Montana's
rules forbid a lawyer from holding himself out as a specialist. Con-
sequently, adoption of the proposed rules in Montana would not
ease specialization restrictions here.
B. Specialization Programs in Other States
States that have specialization programs generally follow one
of three models: strict certification (California plan), self-identifi-
cation (New Mexico/Florida plans), or a mixture of both (ABA
Model plan).07
The California plan, established as a pilot program in 1973,
only permits specialization in taxation, family law, worker's com-
pensation and criminal law.108 To become certified a lawyer must
practice in the field for three years, pass an examination, receive
acceptable peer ratings, attend continuing legal education and con-
tinue to concentrate in the field. 0 9 In contrast to California's rigor-
ous certification requirements, New Mexico and Florida require no
examination or board approval." 0 Instead, the procedure is one of
self-identification. In New Mexico, a lawyer may specialize in one
area by filing an affidavit stating that he devoted 60 percent of his
practice to the area during the last five years,"' or he may limit his
practice to not more than three areas by publicly stating in which
areas he practices.1 2 Florida permits a lawyer to designate himself
a specialist in not more than three of 20 permissible areas by show-
106. Id., Rule 7.4.
107. As of June 1980 nine states had some program. BULLETIN, supra note 69, at 36-42.
108. BULLETIN, supra note 69, at 45.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 45, 49.
111. STATE OF NEW MEXICO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANONS AND Disci-
PLINARY RULES, RULE 2-105(B).
112. Id., RULE 2-105(C).
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ing that he has substantial experience in the area and that he has
attended a minimum amount of continuing legal education. " ' Fi-
nally, the ABA Model plan, which has been characterized as a mid-
dle course between designation and certification," 4 requires law-
yers to have substantial involvement in the area, attend continuing
legal education, provide references and pass a written or oral ex-
amination, if the state so chooses. ' 5
These programs are welcomed efforts to permit lawyers to
practice specialization openly. Commentators have explored their
relative merits and disadvantages at length." 6 Seldom discussed,
however, are faults common to all the programs. First, none offers
protection to legal consumers who rely on that apparent expertise.
Second, the programs do not allow for various gradations of legal
expertise; specialization is all or nothing. Third, since the bar im-
poses the restrictions on itself, it has an incentive to design them
so that competition within the bar is avoided." 7 Finally, bar regu-
lation of specialization, as with other advertising restrictions, rests
on the assumption that the bar knows what information consumers
consider relevant when shopping for lawyers. No room is left for
individual lawyers or consumer groups to explore alternatives.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: WARRANTIES
Extending warranty liability to lawyers who advertise offers
promising solutions to the problems presented above. This section
examines the application of this warranty theory to the area of le-
gal advertising and specialization.
Traditionally, warranty liability has not been applied to pro-
fessionals, in particular lawyers, for three reasons. First, under
traditional interpretations of the Uniform Commercial Code,
courts have held that express and implied warranties arise only
where transactions involve "goods." Since lawyers, like other pro-
113. BY-LAW UNDER THE INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, art. XVII, § 4.
114. BULLETIN, supra note 69, at 26.
115. ABA MODEL PLAN OF SPECIALIZATION, 8.1 through -.4, 10.(1979).
116. After exploring the various programs, a Montana commentator recommended
that Montana model its plan after Florida's and the Model Plan. Comment, Legal Speciali-
zation: A Proposal for More Accessible and Higher Quality Legal Service, 40 MONT. L. REv.
287, 305 (1979). See also Pickering, Why I Favor the New Mexico Plan, 48 FLA. B.J. 180
(1974); Davidson, A Brief for the California Plan, 48 FLA. B.J. 184 (1974); Adams, The
Florida Plan Is Best, 48 FLA. B.J. 185 (1974).
117. Huber, Competition at the Bar and the Proposed Code of Professional Stan-
dards, 57 N.C. L. REV. 559 (1979) (argues that a major, but unarticulated objective of bar
associations is to prevent competition both among those in the profession and from outsid-
ers; also analyzes the anti-competitive aspects of the current code, including restrictions on
advertising).
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fessionals, provide "services" and not "goods," warranty liability
has not been applied.118 Second, because of the complex and un-
predictable nature of law, lawyers have been held only to a duty of
reasonable care in conducting their practice.11 ' Third, lawyers, as
professionals, did not attract clients by advertising.120 In essence,
then, it appears that warranty liability has not been applied to
lawyers because lawyers traditionally have not been viewed as
members of the market place.
Two commentators, Steinberg and Rosen, argue that the rea-
sons above fail to justify exempting professionals, particularly law-
yers, from warranty liability.' First, it must be noted that the
Uniform Commercial Code does not preclude the extension of war-
ranty liability to professional services.122 Logic supports this exten-
sion by analogy since society's interest in protecting an individual's
welfare is independent of how a certain transaction is character-
ized. The same harm may result whether the transaction involves
goods or services.2 3 Second, regardless of a transaction's label, the
lawyer can better predict the merchantability or effectiveness of
his services; therefore, he should stand behind those predictions if
he chooses to make them.12 4 Third, arguably, consumers rely more
on a lawyer's expertise and reputation than on those of a
merchant, and advertising by lawyers can only increase this reli-
ance. '2 Fourth, the lawyer generally can bear the loss better than
his innocent client. 26 Finally, the argument that law is unpredict-
able ignores the fact that many advertised services are routine and
entail the use of mass-produced forms.12 7
Steinberg and Rosen argue that when a lawyer advertises and
triggers consumer reliance, he should be held to have expressly or
118. Steinberg and Rosen, Legal Advertising and Warranty Liability: "Let the Law-
yer Beware," 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 443, 445 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Steinberg and Rosen].
119. Id. at 445-46.
120. Id. at 445.
121. See generally id. (authors examine in detail the application of warranty liability
to lawyers). See also S. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-1 through -13 (1980) (discussion of express and implied warranties)
[hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
122. Comment 2, U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978 version) states in part:
[Tihe warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb
those lines of case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be
confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract.
123. Steinberg and Rosen, supra note 118, at 458.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 458-59.
127. Id. at 464.
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impliedly warranted his product.12 8 To recover under express war-
ranty principles, a consumer must show that the lawyer, in his ad-
vertisement, made a promise or an affirmation of fact that became
a part of the bargain.12 9 Thus, if a lawyer advertises that a client
will receive expert, advantageous representation at low cost, then
the client is entitled to receive that quality of performance at that
cost. Anything short of this expectation would subject the attorney
to express warranty liability. 30 To recover under implied warranty
principles, a consumer must show that the lawyer's product fails to
meet a standard of quality acceptable in the profession.' In other
words, a lawyer who represents himself as a specialist in a particu-
lar area of the law must achieve a level of performance commensu-
rate with that of other specialists in that area. " 2
Steinberg and Rosen do not examine the interplay between
warranty liability and the current disciplinary rules on advertising
and specialization. However, many of the problems associated with
those rules would be solved if warranty liability were imposed in
their stead. First, warranty liability is an improvement over the
Kutak draft, since it avoids the troublesome ban of statements
likely to create unjustified expectations." If a lawyer's advertise-
ment does create an expectation on which a client relies, the law-
yer will be held to have warranted his work-product to that client.
Consequently, lawyers would be forced to tailor advertisements to
avoid the risk of creating unjustified expectations. In certain cases,
a disclaimer would be necessary, but the important point is that
lawyers would be free to communicate the sort of information that
consumers find important.
Second, extending warranty liability to lawyers who advertise
makes specialization restrictions unnecessary. If a lawyer adver-
tises that he specializes in estate planning, he will be held to have
warranted that the client will receive a commensurate level of per-
formance. To prevent liability, lawyers would not advertise abili-
ties they did not possess. Conversely, they could publicize
whatever level of expertise they have achieved, thus avoiding the
128. Id. at 466. Express and implied warranties are treated at length by numerous
authorities. See e.g., Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions,
64 CORNELL L. REv. 30 (1978); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 121. For the purpose of this
comment, an express warranty may be said to arise when a seller creates his own standard
against which his product will be judged. An implied warranty of merchantability, on the
other hand, arises by reference to standards found generally in the trade.
129. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978 version) (by analogy this section may be applied to lawyers).
130. Steinberg and Rosen, supra note 118, at 466.
131. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978 version) (by analogy this section may be applied to lawyers).
132. Steinberg and Rosen, supra note 118, at 464.
133. See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
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"all-or-nothing" flaw created by current specialization programs.""4
Finally, through warranty actions, consumers themselves
would monitor legal advertising and specialization, rather than
third-party bar associations. This prevents bar associations from
using advertising disciplinary rules to reduce competition within
the bar. 135 Consumer enforcement also avoids the problem of the
bar's natural reluctance to discipline its own members. Admittedly,
finding one lawyer to sue another lawyer may be difficult, but the
problem should not be overstated. The increasing number of legal
malpractice suits in recent years suggests that lawyers are not un-
willing to sue other lawyers. 136
Warranty liability, then, provides an effective method for reg-
ulating lawyer advertising that neither impedes the flow of useful
information to consumers, nor infringes on lawyers' First Amend-
ment rights. It should be noted, however, that Montana consumers
would be protected from false or misleading legal advertisements
even if advertising disciplinary rules were abolished and warranty
liability was not extended to lawyers. Currently, a state statute
provides that a lawyer may be criminally liable if he purposely or
knowingly makes a false or deceptive statement to the public for
the purposes of promoting the sale of his services. 187 Also, Mon-
tana's Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act makes
unlawful any deceptive act or practice. This includes the advertis-
ing of services for sale."8"
VI. CONCLUSION
Montana's restrictions on lawyer advertising and specializa-
tion fall within the Canon entitled, "A Lawyer Should Assist the
Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel
Available."1 39 Despite this laudable goal, the restrictions have the
opposite effect; they needlessly restrict the flow of useful informa-
tion to consumers while at the same time thwarting competition
among lawyers and infringing upon First Amendment rights. Be-
cause the proposed rules contained in the Kutak draft are less re-
strictive, their adoption would somewhat ameliorate this effect.
Nevertheless, the Kutak draft contains its own set of questionable
134. See text accompanying notes 116-17 supra.
135. See note 117 supra.
136. There were more reported appellate legal malpractice decisions in the last 15
years than in the preceding 70 years. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 14 (1977).
137. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 45-6-317(1)(b) (1981).
138. MCA § 30-14-103 (1981).
139. MONTANA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, CANON 2 (1980).
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rules. The solution to problems associated with lawyer advertising
and specialization does not lie in better regulation by bar associa-
tions. Instead, it lies in removing bar associations from the entire
area and providing consumers with the necessary tools to protect
themselves.
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APPENDIX
The rules regarding advertising and specialization contained in
the proposed final draft of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct (Kutak draft) read as follows:
RULE 7.1 Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services
A lawyer shall not make any false or misleading com-
munication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. A
communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law,
or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered
as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about
results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the
lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the rules of
professional conduct or other law; or
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers'
services, unless the comparison can be factually
substantiated.
RULE 7.2 Advertising
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3(b),
a lawyer may advertise services through public media, such
as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other
periodical, radio or television, or through written communi-
cation not involving personal contact.
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written
communication shall be kept for one year after its
dissemination.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a per-
son for recommending the lawyer's services, except that a
lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising or writ-
ten communication permitted by this rule.
RULE 7.4 Communication of Fields of Practice
A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer
does or does not practice in particular fields of law. A law-
yer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is a specialist
except as follows:
(a) A lawyer admitted to engage in patent practice
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office may
use the designation "Patent Attorney" or a substantially
similar designation;
(b) A lawyer engaged in admiralty practice may use the
designation "Admiralty," "Proctor in Admiralty" or a sub-
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stantially similar designation; and
(c) [Provisions on designation of specialization of the
particular state].
23
Scott: Lawyer Advertising
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1982
24
Montana Law Review, Vol. 43 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/6
